To address these issues, the cable stated that if Abu Zubaydah were to die during the interrogation, he would be cremated.The interrogation team closed the cable by stating:"regardless which [disposition] option we follow however, and especially in light of the planned psychological pressure techniques to be implemented, we need to get reasonable assurances that [Abu Zubaydah] will remain in isolation and incommunicado for the remainder of his life,"
Officers from the CIA's ALEC Station responded to the interrogation team's comments several days later. Their cable noted that the interrogation teamwas correct in its "understanding that the interrogation process takes precedence over preventative medical procedures."ALEC Station further observed:A few points (admittedly speculative):"There is a fairly unanimous sentiment witiiin HQS that [Abu Zubaydah] will never be placed in a situation where he has any significant contact with others and/or has the opportunity to be released. While it is difficult to discuss specifics at this point, all major players are in concurrence that [Abu Zubaydah] should remain incommunicado for the remainder of his life. This may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from being turned over to another country, but a final decision regarding his future incarceration condition has yet to be made." (PDF pg 34-35)
- The CIA knew what they were planning to do would be deemed immoral or illegal by many within the US government, the American people as well as abroad;
- One transgression leads to another. Why/how did they think it would be possible to keep Abu Zubaydah incommunicado for the rest of his life? Would this mindset itself endanger Abu Zubaydah's life?
- So much of what appears to have occurred, has the appearance of an administrative failure; the failure to train and vet interrogators; to pursue inter-agency cooperation, especially with Justice; to rigorously evaluate the efficacy of methods;
- The administrative failure was by design. The program worked the way its leaders wanted it to.